In the debate about the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the EU's institutional balance
Introduction
At the very moment the Lisbon Treaty entered into force -and thereby brought a decade of constitutional debate in the European Union (EU) to an end -the Eurozone crisis put the new institutional balance to the test. Widely viewed as one of Lisbon's losers, the Commission immediately faced a critical moment that questioned its institutional role (Laffan 2016) . The EU's handling of the crisis raised serious questions about the Commission's role in economic governance and EU policy-making in general.
Although the debate about the Commission's influence over EU policy is as old as European integration itself (e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1965) , the focus over the last two decades has been on its apparent decline, challenged by the growing role of the European Council, the empowerment of the European Parliament, and the creation of new regulatory agencies (e.g., Kassim and Menon 2010; Kassim et al. 2013: 131-135) . More recently, this argument has been extended by advocates of a 'new intergovernmentalism' who emphasize the proliferation of decision-making processes beyond the Community method, the reluctance of member states to delegate further competences to the 'traditional' supranational institutions, and the emergence of the European Council as the central actor in EU policy-making (Bickerton et al. 2015a) . The new intergovernmentalism seeks to 'recast' the role of the Commission and the Court of Justice 'in a new mould', arguing that these institutions are now 'more circumspect about the pursuit of ever closer union' (Bickerton et al. 2015b: 39) . In the era of new intergovernmentalism, which began with the Maastricht Treaty, they are 'are no longer the "engines of integration" that they once were' (Bickerton et al. 2015a: 717) . Authors writing from this perspective about the crisis depict the Commission as the 'little engine that wouldn't' (Hodson 2013) . More modestly, Peterson (2015: 207) argues that, despite the trend towards an intergovernmentalist dynamic, the Commission 'mostly gets on with its work', which mainly 'is focused on closer European policy cooperation'. It might even represent 'an oasis of calm within the storm' in the disequilibrium that is the current EU. Becker and Bauer (2014) , by contrast, have challenged the view that the Commission's role has been diminished as a result of the crisis and contend, to the contrary, that the Commission emerged stronger with important new managerial tasks in economic governance. This article argues that the impact of the crisis on the Commission is considerably more complex than is suggested by the current debate and contests key elements of the new intergovernmentalist approach. First, any assessment of the effects of the crisis on the Commission in the institutional balance needs to look beyond either policy-making as highlighted by the new intergovernmentalism or management responsibilities. A more global examination, acknowledging external and internal dynamics, is necessary. The Commission's role as an engine of integration that seeks to provide leadership and impetus for EU policy-making, its own traditional interpretation of its mandate to 'promote the general interest of the Union' (Art. 17 TEU), needs to be reconsidered. Entrepreneurship, i.e., aiming "to induce authoritative political decisions that would not otherwise occur", by the Commission has long been based on 'favoring more ambitious schemes for further institutional and substantive integration' (Moravcsik 1999, 271) . It is now more subtle and versatile.
Second, although the number of proposals adopted by the Commission -and, correspondingly, the volume of EU legislation -did fall when the Eurozone crisis broke in 2010, the crisis was a catalyst rather than a cause of the decline in legislative proposals. The crisis did not initiate the change, but altered the speed of a process of change that had already been underway for a number of years. Moreover, contrary to claims that the Commission had retreated or been eclipsed by the European Council, analysis shows that far from abandoning the field, the Commission concentrated its attention on aspects of economic governance and provided leadership in areas that pertained directly to the Eurozone crisis.
Third, the explanation for a reduction of the Commission's policy activism is to be found in an intra-organizational process rather than the inter-institutional dynamic highlighted by the new intergovernmentalism. The downward trend in the Commission's decisional outputs was the result of concerted action on the part of its eleventh President, José Manuel Barroso, to strengthen presidential control over the Commission's policy activism, especially during his second term, not displacement of the Commission by the European Council. Indeed, the crisis accelerated the process of presidentialization that had begun during Barroso's first term. Both Barroso after 2010 and Jean-Claude Juncker, his successor, have used the enhanced powers and resources available to the office to take personal control over the Commission agenda and to end the expansionist policy activism that historically characterised the organization. As a result, a new model of Commission intervention has emerged -top-down managed, measured, restrained, and strategic -that contrasts with the unprogrammatic and piecemeal approach of the past.
Drawing on new empirical evidence -two large-scale surveys in the Commission, 1 interviews with high-level officials, and legislative data from EUR-Lex -to support these contentions, the article proposes a new interpretation of the impact of the crisis on the Commission and a new assessment of the organization's post-crisis position. It contends that the Commission may face increased constraints, but its capacity to legislate, even in controversial areas such as economic governance, is still important. Moreover, its expanded management duties mean new opportunities to provide impetus for EU policy-making. Finally, the emergence of presidentialized leadership has equipped the Commission with a new strategic ability, enabling it to act more programmatically and with greater focus than previously.
The Commission on the Eve of the Crisis
In order to assess the changes in the role of the Commission during the crisis, it is essential to revisit the point of departure. The Commission had already undergone several transformations by the time the Eurozone crisis unfolded in 2010. This section reviews its condition before the crisis, at the end of 2009, to provide a benchmark against which to assess subsequent change.
Institutional and Political Environment
The Commission has historically been an embattled institution (see e.g. Lindberg 1965 (Bauer 2006; Laffan 1997; Metcalfe 1992; Menon 2004, 2010) . Finally, some policy fields were by now almost saturated; the main legislative work had been done. The governance of the single market had, for instance, broadly moved from development to management (see also Pelkmans 2016) . In general, the Commission was now more concerned with implementation, better regulation and improving the quality of existing legislation than promulgating new laws. The combined effect of the institutional and political environment for the Commission was thus a stronger focus on management rather than policy entrepreneurship.
Internal Organization
The presidentialization of the Commission was also a key factor in the pre-crisis years. Starting from a low base (Campbell 1983: 181) , the Commission presidency has become increasingly powerful since the 1990s and especially since 2004 (Kassim 2012; Kassim et al. 2016) .
Acutely aware of growing Euroscepticism, wariness if not hostility about intervention from 'Brussels' on the part of national capitals, and seeking to combat the perception of the Commission as a remote bureaucracy driven by a relentless desire to regulate 'every matter under the sun', Barroso used the constitutional powers available to the office to strengthen the Commission Presidency as a means to control policy activism within the institution. He believed that the Commission could only succeed if it concentrated on issues where the EU could demonstrably add value, showed greater sensitivity to member governments, and made more use of options other than 'hard' law (Kurpas et al. 2008 roso as strong on 'setting a policy agenda' and 'managing the house'. These views were expressed especially strongly by cabinet members and senior managers. In interviews, senior managers in particular testified that Barroso closely controlled the policy agenda at all levels of the policy process. Cabinet members highlighted how in meetings of 'special chefs', the President's chef de cabinet had shaped, delayed or effectively vetoed policy proposals. They noted that Barroso kept a much tighter rein on the Commission's policy programme than his immediate predecessors (see Kassim et al. 2013: ch 6) .
It would be surprising if such a dramatic reorientation had been welcomed positively by staff. Most theoretical perspectives on bureaucratic change, including sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism -public choice accounts are an exception -suggest that bureaucrats are conservative and wary about, if not hostile, to administrative reform (Kassim 2008 ). In the case of the Commission, concentration of power in the hands of the President was at odds with the principle and the practice of collegiality (Dimitrakopoulos 2008 ) and the assertion of presidential control over policy was likely to offend not only other members of the College, but Directors General who had been powerful and important policymaking figures (Coombes 1970; Kassim et al. 2016) . Coming immediately after the Kinnock reforms, which had sought to give the Commission a stronger organizational steering capacity and to strengthen management, but on which staff were divided (Kassim 2008; Kassim et al. 2003: ch 8) , the presidentialisation of policy-making authority was likely to be interpreted as a further step away from the Commission's traditional mission.
Evidence from 'The European Commission in Question' shows that there was indeed strong ambivalence among Commission staff about both presidentialisation and the emergence of a more interventionist Secretariat General that had accompanied it (Kassim et al. 2013 : chs 6, 7). They were also divided on whether coordination from the centre was a good thing and on the new emphasis on management. Although recognizing that the introduction of processes such as SPP had been intended to make the overall administration more systematic, effective and accountable, many doubted its effectiveness and value. Moreover, for many officials, 'managerialism' ran counter to the Commission's culture, which prized policy formu- 
Legislative Activity
The institutional and organizational transformations of the Commission preceding the crisis are clearly reflected in its output of the time. In line with his ambitions, Barroso succeeded in shifting the Commission towards a more programmatic, disciplined and sensitive approach. It has not become less active but more and more diversified in the use of legislative instruments and increasingly opting for less intrusive measures. Analysis of data from EUR-Lex reveals that the EU executive reduced the number of hard law proposals after a peak of legislative activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see also Kurpas et al. 2008) . Table 1 ). The overall output thus remained fairly constant over the years, but its composition changed considerably. There have also been significant shifts between policy fields. 
The Commission and the Crisis
When the Eurozone crisis unfolded in 2010, it threw the EU into political and institutional turmoil. In regard to the Commission, however, the crisis mainly served as a catalyst that reinforced trends in its institutional and political environment, internal organization and legislative activity.
Institutional and Political Environment
In line with its new status accorded by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council emerged as the main venue for debating how the EU should respond to the Eurozone crisis (Puetter 2012) .
Although it has no legislative function under Article 15 TEU, in what might be interpreted as a deliberate move to pre-empt discussions of strong supranational solutions, the European
Council not only defined the broad strokes of the crisis response but also put forward policy The crisis has thus reinforced, at least in economic governance, the Commission's shift from policy entrepreneurship to management. Rather than weakening its position, however, this has strengthened the Commission, as the delegated tasks are not purely administra-tive matters. On the contrary, these coordination, negotiation and monitoring duties come with some discretion in highly political matters. The crisis and its institutional outcomes have therefore created new opportunities for the Commission to influence policy-making in the EU, even if they are less obvious than the classic entrepreneurship through hard law proposals.
Internal Organization
The crisis served to reinforce presidential leadership, first under Barroso II and second with the election of Jean-Claude Juncker. At the outset of his second term in 2010, which followed the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the preceding year, Barroso reinforced the Commission President's leadership role. Symbolising his pursuit of his aim of a more programmatic approach to policy, Barroso introduced a State of Union speech, to be given by the Commission President each September -the first was delivered in 2010 -that would set the main policy priorities not only of the Commission, but of the EU more generally, for the coming year.
The speech would inform the policy agenda set out in the Commission's annual work programme. Moreover, Barroso took the decision that in the prevailing climate of austerity the Commission should focus its attention on crisis-related areas of policy only. Intervention in other areas would be seen as an unnecessary distraction. In the words of a senior manager in the Secretariat General: 'the legislative activity of the Commission was put on the backburner or in the freezer for a while'. Second, a complaint of the leadership during the Barroso era, particularly in the second term, had been that individual Commissioners often 'went missing' at moments of stress. 
Legislative Activity
The crisis years brought further shifts in legislative activity by the Commission. Existing trends continued and partly accelerated. Overall, the output of the Commission fell during Barroso II, even compared to Barroso I. However, the reduction was only indirectly due to the crisis and more an effect of the mechanisms introduced to increase the Commission President's control over policy-making. The role played by the Secretariat General and procedures such as impact assessment and the advance notice required by SPP to allow entry to the Commission work programme were effective in the development of a more programmatic approach and to dampening policy activism. Table 2 ). In comparison with the immediate pre-crisis years, it not only surpassed the declining output in agriculture and fisheries, but also the most upcoming field in the first decade of the new millennium, that is justice and home affairs. Further evidence for Commission assertiveness can be found in its exercise of coordination functions. Schmidt (2016) shows how the Commission slowly changed the direction of policy coordination in the Europe 2020 strategy from strictly economic -i.e., subordinating every policy field to fiscal consolidation -to a broader, increasingly social agenda. More broadly, the Commission has used the reformed architecture of the European Semester to bolster the effect of country-specific recommendations, which are in principle not binding, by symbolically coupling them with its monitoring results in macroeconomic surveillance. In managing the field of financial stability support, it also turned towards more social and growth-friendly policies. Again, the incoming Juncker Commission intensified these efforts.
Juncker's efforts in brokering a deal for a third Greek bailout in the spring of 2015 incensed the German and like-minded governments. His ostensible sympathy for Greek demands led the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, to publicly reflect on curtailing the powers of the Commission by separating its political leadership from some administrative functions (Mussler 2015) . These examples show that the Commission is both willing and able to influence EU policy-making in economic governance. To this end, it is not any longer fully dependent hard law proposals, but increasingly competent to pursue its agenda through the various management functions it has gathered during the crisis. By linking its outputs in the various monitoring and coordination procedures, it can provide quite some impetus in economic governance.
Conclusion: A new kind of engine?
Although the Eurozone crisis severely tested the Commission, it was only the latest challenge for an institution that has been embattled since the Maastricht Treaty and arguably before. The
Commission has been repeatedly challenged by empowered institutions, i.e., the European Council and the European Parliament, and since the 1990s has been constrained by a political climate that has been increasingly hostile to action on the part of 'Brussels'. Yet the crisis did not change the Commission. Rather, it acted as a catalyst for a process of transformation that was already underway. On taking office in 2004, Barroso argued for a more presidential
Commission that would take a more measured, strategic and responsive approach to policy.
The crisis strengthened his hand, leading him to limit Commission action to those areas of policy that required urgent action -economic and monetary policy, financial services, competition policy, and trade.
Although the Commission is under pressure, it is not facing general decline. Rather, its approach and outlook has changed. A new more restrained model has emerged, with the ex-pansionist and interventionist ways of the past firmly set aside. Policy entrepreneurship in the classic sense -i.e., formulating and pushing for hard law -may be increasingly difficult in the current EU, but the Commission can succeed if its efforts are strategic and focused. Moreover, its array of management duties ensures that it is able to exert influence on EU action in less intrusive ways. At the same time, the crisis accelerated the process of presidentialisation within the Commission, leaving the President with new powers and resources to take personal control over the policy agenda. In combination, increased management responsibilities and strong presidentialism allowed the Commission to be assertive in the crisis context. The lesson from the crisis years is therefore that, at least in economic governance, the Commission is still able to act as an engine of integration; yet it is an engine increasingly different from the traditional understanding.
It remains to be seen whether this transformation will take the same form and have the same effect in other areas. As the Commission's competences vary across policy areas, different sectoral modes of entrepreneurialism may emerge. Given the trend of presidentialisation, and along with it prioritisation, some policy areas will receive even less attention in the near future -a tendency evident in interviews with some outgoing Commissioners in 2014, who expressed disappointment that items from their portfolios rarely featured on the Commission's agenda. The Commission will not be able or willing to advance integration in all fields at all times or at the same pace.
Yet, although the Commission has been remodelled, it is not clear that it has been 'recast' 'in a new mould' (Bickerton et al. 2015b: 39) as suggested by the new intergovernmentalism. The argument that it is by now more circumspect about pursuing an ever closer union cannot be dismissed. Neither can the claim that supranational institutions act strategically depending on the level of support in the political environment. But the assertion that the Commission has abandoned any pretentions to leadership or any policy ambitions appears to be unwarranted. Not only has the Commission emerged from the Eurozone crisis with expanded management functions, as Puetter (2015) has acknowledged, which it can and does use to provide less intrusive impetus for policy-making; classic Commission policy entrepreneurship also remains, as initiatives in the area of economic governance and beyond (financial services, energy, the environment and migration) make clear.
The changing institutional balance since the Lisbon Treaty and the Eurozone crisis, in particular in the field of leadership, may go beyond the traditional dichotomy of integration theory. Crespy and Menz (2015: 765) have, for instance, argued that a 'new hybrid form of governance drawing from both political intergovernmentalism and technocratic supranationalism' has emerged in the wake of the latter. The role of the Commission appears to be a prime example. Far-reaching entrepreneurship has diminished to a large extent but many of the new technical duties in budgetary and macroeconomic monitoring, have a strong political component, with leadership implications. The Commission has also shown historically that it can act as a 'purposeful opportunist' (Cram 1994: 214) , employing various techniques beyond the proposal of hard law to eventually further integration. Now that it is more hierarchical in its internal organization, the strategic use of different methods to realize this goal is even more feasible. The Commission's role as an engine of integration will therefore endure, but in a different guise. 3 Some of these differences reflect cross-sectoral variation in the development of the acquis communautaire. In some areas, the regulatory regime was already mature. In others, EU legislative action was newer or had been less extensive. 
